In the late 1960's millions of Red Guards, who had earlier
taken to the streets full of faith in Mao, found themselves
discarded in the countryside where they discovered that the
peasants were still living in primitive conditions after two
decades of socialist development. In 1971, Mao Zedong's "closest
comrade-in-arms" and trusted successor Lin Biao perished in the
course of his alleged military coup attempt against the Great
Helmsman. These events provoked a sense of moral outrage among
significant numbers of Chinese, as they began to ask themselves
how such things could have happened.
All over the country, thousands formed small groups to discuss
what had gone wrong with the political system. Some wrote letters
of protest or advice to Chairman Mao; a few may have plotted
violent action against the regime. These groups were rooted out
by the police in campaigns called "cleansing of class ranks"
(1968-69) and "one-strike, three-anti" (1970-71 ). Hundreds of
their members were executed. (1) Although the regime surmounted
this particular crisis of political control, its ideological
control continued to weaken.
Only one group of dissidents of the early 1970's became known in
the West, after its members hung a wall poster in Canton in 1974
under the pseudonym Li Yizhe. The poster attacked Maoist
autocracy in the thin disguise of what it called the "Lin Biao
system. " As a solution to the flaws of dictatorship, the Li
Yizhe group called on the National People's Congress (NPC) to
exercise its powers. (2) The Li Yizhe group thus introduced what
was to become a consistent strategy of Chinese democrats, namely,
attempting to ameliorate or circumvent one-party dictatorship by
taking seriously the provision, found in every constitution of
the People's Republic of China (PRC), that the National People's
Congress is the supreme organ of government. This strategy was
prominently reflected in many articles written during the debate
over political reform in 1986-87. It surfaced again during the
May 1989 crisis when Cao Siyuan, a self-styled lobbyist
affiliated with the Stone Group Corporation (a privately-owned
computer company in Beijing), and Hu Jiwei, a reformist member of
the NPC Standing Committee, attempted to convene a meeting of the
Standing Committee to overturn Premier Li Peng's May 20
declaration of martial law. After the crackdown on June 4, Cao
was arrested and Hu subjected to political denunciation.
By 1989, what had started as congeries of small, isolated,
clandestine groups which did not know of each other's existence,
had grown step by step - through the Tiananmen Square Incident of
1976, the Democracy Wall movement of 1978-79, and the student
demonstrations of 1985 and 1986-87 - into a national force that
apparently had the participation or sympathy of almost all urban
residents in China. In the process, the movement for Chinese
democracy became more complicated in its social composition and
in its mix of political goals and tactics.
Although the movement crossed a major watershed in 1989, when
many intellectuals gave up hope that the regime of Deng Xiaoping
was capable of reforming itself politically from within, both
before and after June 4, the democratic movement of 1989 retained
strong continuities in personnel, goals, and tactics with its
predecessors. The mainstream democratic movement has always
maintained hope that the authorities would initiate the changes
for which it was calling. Indeed, the movement's moderation is
striking. Chinese democrats have consistently positioned
themselves as remonstrators rather than opponents, pressing the
party to reform in its own interests and in keeping with its own
ideals. (3) This position did not change in 1989. The movement's
main organizations - comprised before June 4 of the Capital
Federation of Autonomous College Student Organizations (
Gaozilian
), the Capital Federation of Intellectual Circles (
Beizhilian
), and the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation (
Gongzilian
), and, after June 4, of the Chinese Democratic Alliance (
Minzhu Zhongguo zhenxian
), the Association of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United
States and the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (also known as
China Spring) - have all said that they do not seek the overthrow
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Even after the regime's use
of force on June 4, the main elements of the democracy movement
have not changed their commitment to nonviolent methods in
bringing about political change.
Several factors account for the moderation of the democracy
movement. The Chinese democrats have long believed that the
regime was capable of reform from within, and the democrats
themselves continued to believe in socialism, albeit of a
democratic variety. But a moderate approach was also prudent, for
the regime retained command over the police and the military, and
it previously showed itself willing to use these instruments of
coercion to suppress the opposition. Finally, the democracy
movement was made up almost entirely of students and
intellectuals, a small minority within Chinese society. These
people lacked the numbers and the willingness to confront the
regime head-on. These factors combined to incline Chinese
democrats to press for a "self-limiting revolution" in the
People's Republic of China.
Reform From Within
Perhaps the most important factor of those mentioned above is
that the regime's ideology claims to be democratic and leaders of
the opposition have thus had reason to hope for reform from
within. All four constitutions of the PRC affirmed popular
sovereignty, contained provisions for citizens to vote and run
for office, and guaranteed the rights of free speech, assembly,
petition and demonstration. Even if largely rhetorical, such
provisions pay tribute to the strength of democratic yearnings in
China and set standards that the regime has to pretend to meet in
some fashion.
Mao resolved the contradiction between rhetoric and reality with
the concept of "democratic dictatorship," which held that the
system was democratic because the totalitarian vanguard party was
serving the highest interests of the people - whether they liked
it or not. Those subjected to repression were not the people but
their enemies. However cynical the argument, many Chinese
believed in it and in Mao's benevolence and wisdom. Many blamed
the problems that they encountered in their own lives on
individual cadres rather than on the system and the assumption
was widespread that Mao did not intend the abuses that were
carried out in his name. Paradoxically, the practice of writing
letters of remonstrance and appeal to Mao was common in the
darkest days of his regime, perhaps more common than in his
relatively lenient periods.
Such beliefs had faded by the time of the Tiananmen Square
Incident of April 5, 1976, especially among the sophisticated
factory and office workers and Communist Youth League members in
the capital who formed the main force of the demonstrators. (4)
But the demonstrators still directed the brunt of their criticism
at those around Mao and not at Mao himself. This made it possible
for Deng's regime, which never contemplated full de-Maoization,
to reverse the verdict on the incident only two years after Mao's
death.
Hopes for democratization from the top down revived after Mao's
passing. Under Hu Yaobang's leadership of the CCP Organization
Department, millions of individuals were exonerated from unjust
criminal and political verdicts and rehabilitated, some
posthumously. Property was returned, jobs restored, reputations
cleared. Hu sponsored the "debate over practice as the sole
criterion of truth," which opened the way for the expression of
fresh ideas that party theorists had been nurturing in "cowpens"
and May 7 cadre schools during the years when they were condemned
to internal exile.
Most participants in the Democracy Wall movement in 1978-79 were
convinced that Deng wanted democratization and welcomed their
suggestions. Only a few like Wei Jingsheng argued that Deng was a
"new dictator," that temporary tolerance for unsolicited advice
was not equivalent to a restructuring of power, and that a
democratic climate without democratic institutions could easily
dissipate wherever a change of course was initiated at the top.
In the eyes of most intellectuals, the arguments of Wei and those
who thought like him were premature. The intellectuals believed
that reform is invariably a lengthy process; moreover, although
Deng could not afford to move too fast because of conservative
resistance in the party, he nevertheless was proceeding with
deliberate speed in a democratic direction and had to be given
plenty of time. Most democratic activists saw Deng's arrest of
Wei and his fellow-thinkers as regrettable but inevitable. At the
time it was felt by many that what Wei had said was true enough,
but it was not the time to say it.
In 1980, Deng himself called for political reform, reviving the
hope that he would pilot China toward democracy. In a major
speech delivered in August, he set modest goals and stressed that
political reform was meant to strengthen, not weaken, party
leadership. (5) Some people around Deng, such as Liao Gailong,
took the speech as license to argue for more far-reaching
reforms, including the vitalization of the people's congress
system. (6) For some of the democrats, reform of the people's
congress election system opened the vista of a parliamentary road
to influence. They competed vigorously in the county-level
elections held in 1979-81. (7) Until 1989, Deng continued to
entertain the notion of political reform and allowed it to be
discussed sporadically. An especially vigorous public discussion
took place during 1987, after Deng had stated that political
restructuring must be part of the reform agenda.
It is clear in retrospect that Deng meant what he said when he
warned that reform must not infringe on the four cardinal
principles, namely, keeping to the socialist road, upholding the
people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the CCP, and
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, but this warning was not
so clearly understood at the time he issued it. His words and
actions were ambiguous. His speeches contained little abstract
political discussion, making it hard to determine the
intellectual logic of his position. Some thought the ambiguity
was tactical, as he maneuvered to maintain a fragile coalition of
reformers and conservatives. Others viewed Deng as intellectually
confused, unaware that he could not reform the economy without
reforming politics. My guess is that Deng shared the assumption
of many Chinese political thinkers, including Mao, that democracy
is an instrument of mobilization whose function is to strengthen
the links of citizens to the state, rather than a set of
procedures for limiting state power to protect individual rights.
(8) Thus, Deng did not see a contradiction between his vision of
democracy and a benevolent dictatorship exercised by him and his
party.
Although one may argue that Chinese democrats misread Deng, they
were probably not entirely wrong in thinking that Deng's closest
aides and designated successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, were
willing to consider relatively far-reaching measures of political
reform. Hu, head of the CCP Organization Department in 1977-78
and CCP General Secretary from 1982 to 1987, sponsored a two-part
"Conference for the Discussion of Guidelines for Theoretical
Work" (
Lilun gongzuo wuxu hui
) in January-April 1979, at which liberal party thinkers he had
rehabilitated or promoted began the overhaul of Chinese
Marxism-Leninism needed to provide an ideological basis for
reforms. (9) Under a pseudonym, at least one of the works
produced at this conference found its way into a publication at
Democracy Wall. (10)
According to people who worked with Hu, his driving motive was to
guarantee that another Cultural Revolution could never occur.
Thus, he advocated subjecting the ruling party to outside
challenges and criticism. Although his vision of political
pluralism did not envisage a rotation in power between the CCP
and other political parties, Hu was willing to consider a number
of other suggestions, such as expanding the role of the NPC and
dividing it into two or three chambers. Hu also believed that the
women's organizations, the Communist Youth League, trade unions,
and professional associations should have greater independence
from the CCP, saying, "If we control them so tightly, why bother
to have separate organizations?" (11)
Hu was popular among intellectuals for his openness to their
ideas, and was criticized by the army newspaper in 1982 for
laxness in maintaining ideological discipline. He was purged from
his party secretaryship in January 1987, after student
demonstrations persuaded the party elders that he was allowing
"bourgeois liberalization" to get out of hand. It was his death
on April 15, 1989, that triggered the student demonstrations.
Zhao Ziyang's record was more ambiguous. His chief commitment was
to economic growth, and for him the main question seemed to be
what sort of political structures would best meet the needs of
economic development. It seemed inevitable that the marketization
he favored would lead indirectly to the eventual break-up of
dictatorship. But beyond this some advisors found him receptive
to the argument that development in the modern age would
eventually require lifting constraints on information and
tolerating social pluralism and its more open political conflict.
Zhao was associated with the theory of the "primary stage of
socialism," which legitimated a diversity of social interests.
His aide Bao Tong articulated the concept of "the new order of
the socialist commodity economy," which rationalized wider use of
elections and more political openness. (12) In 1986, Bao Tong
authorized the establishment in Beijing of the Fund for the
Reform and Opening of China, financed by the American businessman
George Soros, and operating, at least officially, independently
of Chinese government control. According to one report, Zhao
commissioned the preparation of a political reform proposal that
included ideas for multi-party competition and an independent
press. (13) These actions indicated that Zhao was interested in a
substantial opening and pluralization of the political system, at
least over the long term.
On the other hand, Zhao presented a notably cautious program in
the section on political reform of his report to the 13th Party
Congress in October 1987. In the months before his fall from
power, people around him promoted a theory called the "new
authoritarianism," which argued that in the present, relatively
early state of development China needs an enlightened autocrat to
direct economic development while keeping order and protecting
people's rights. We will probably never know to what extent this
argument reflected Zhao's technocratic convictions, and to what
extent it was propounded as a means to induce Deng Xiaoping to
hand over power to Zhao quickly and without dividing it among
several successors.
In any case, during the May-June crisis Zhao's tactics shifted.
According to the subsequent official charges against him, he
supported Deng Xiaoping's hard line on the demonstrations while
he was on a state visit to North Korea in late April. But upon
his return he changed his position, calling for the withdrawal of
the controversial People's Daily editorial that branded the
demonstrations a "turmoil" and advocating other concessions. (14)
His conciliatory words and actions in public indicated that calls
for the resignation of Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping did not
displease him. On the eve of the declaration of martial law,
officials and intellectuals associated with Zhao issued a
six-point statement blaming the crisis on Deng and calling for
special NPC and CCP meetings to examine errors of the past and,
by implication, to summon Zhao (who had already been unofficially
purged) back to power. In the aftermath of the June 4 crackdown,
many members of Zhao's liberal brain trust fled the country. They
now appear to maintain links with the exile democratic movement
headed by Yan Jiaqi, a political scientist and former advisor to
Zhao. Because they represent a faction within the CCP that may
some day return to power, their alliance with the democracy
movement allows Chinese democrats to continue even now to hope
for reform of the communist regime from within.
That Zhao's interest in democracy during the crisis may have been
tactical does not render it insignificant. Transitions from
authoritarianism to democracy normally come about when
authoritarian rulers see tactical advantages in such shifts. If
Zhao's effort to play the democracy card had succeeded, he might
have reverted soon to a more authoritarian position in order to
consolidate his power and address China's economic problems. But
meanwhile, Zhao's behavior demonstrated that those who hoped for
change of the Chinese communist system from within had some
grounds for their hopes.
Whatever the personal views of various party leaders, by the end
of 1988, the actual achievements of officially-sponsored
political reform were meager. They included regularization and
expansion of the role of people's congresses, direct elections of
county-level people's congress deputies, limitations on terms of
office for some party and state officials, establishment of
employee councils in state-owned enterprises, and the enactment
of several hundred laws conducive to procedural regularity. The
reform program also endorsed collective leadership in the party,
orderly succession, the rule of law, and independence of the
judiciary, but these desiderata remained weakly
institutionalized. (15) There were signs that some in the
leadership favored further steps toward political reform in 1989,
including passing a law making the press more free and
independent but still subject ultimately to party guidance;
enacting a law on demonstrations permitting peaceful gatherings
while still enabling the government to restrict their scope; (16)
reducing the role of party officials in student organizations,
trade unions, enterprises, and schools, while preserving the
party organs in these units as watchdogs; and further
strengthening the role of the National People's Congress as a
legislative and oversight organ under overall party guidance. In
the crisis of spring 1989, even such half-way steps might have
sufficed to satisfy many of the demonstrators. In the long run,
they were unlikely to satisfy Chinese democrats, any more than
similar solutions seem to have satisfied Polish or Hungarian
democrats. The push for real freedom of the press and of
association, as well as for truly competitive elections would
have resumed, probably sooner rather than later. But in the
meantime, the liberal images of Deng, Hu, and Zhao, whether they
were justified or not, helped to keep Chinese democrats looking
for change from above.
The Democracy Movement's Ideals
The second reason for the Chinese democrats' long-standing
posture of loyalty to the regime is the nature of their own
ideals. With few exceptions, the opposition's vision of Chinese
democracy has been compatible with a socialist order. At
Democracy Wall in 1978-79, most of the proposals were made from
the perspective of party members or non-party loyalists. They
called for very modest measures of political openness and
competition, more in the spirit of Mao's idea of a party with an
"open door" to society than in the spirit of a Western
multi-party system. In 1986-87, the high point of the intra-party
and academic debate over political reform that had been initiated
by Deng, major proposals included establishing a civil service
system; strengthening the National People's Congress by reducing
its size and enlarging its system of committees; separating the
party from the government; giving a clear legal definition to
vertical and horizontal jurisdictions in the bureaucracy;
publishing more financial data to assure greater governmental
"transparency"; providing firmer guarantees of an independent
judiciary; consulting more systematically with experts and
technocrats in policy-making; and paying more consistent
attention to procedures in governmental decision-making. (17) The
emphases were on openness and procedural regularity.
None of the 1986-87 proposals that I have seen was anti-socialist
or calculated to lead to the overthrow of the party. To be sure,
the idea of socialism had become so diluted that it would have
been hard to identify an anti-socialist proposal unless its
author labeled it as such. Most of the democrats' proposals dealt
with economic structures indirectly if at all and, among the
economic reformers, even proposals for privatization and
marketization of the economy were cast as versions of socialism.
(For example, a proposal for issuing stock in state enterprises
was presented as promoting "ownership by the whole people.")
After the purge of Zhao Ziyang, a People's Daily editorial
charged that in a 1987 intra-party meeting even Zhao advocated
abandoning the insistence on upholding socialism on the grounds
that nobody knew any more what socialism was. (18) Similarly,
proposals for competitive electoral politics would not have been
cast as open challenges to the principle of party leadership even
if they were intended as such. Indeed, the moderate guise of most
proposals may signify little except that Chinese are adept at
waving the red flag to oppose the red flag.
My own reading of the political reform debates and personal
encounters with some of the participants, however, lead me to
believe that in most cases the reformers wanted to keep China
socialist as they understood the term. For example, Yan Jiaqi, Li
Honglin, Su Shaozhi, and Cao Siyuan, who were named in Beijing
Mayor Chen Xitong's post-crackdown report as progenitors of the
"turmoil" and "counter-revolutionary rebellion" in Beijing, (19)
were among the leading participants in the 1986-87 discussions of
political reform. All were party members; all seemed to espouse
some version of socialism.
With some individual variation, the vision of the reformist party
intellectuals centered on a system in which the communist party
continued to be dominant but was checked by competitive elections
and a free press in order to keep it honest and close to the
people. This dominant party would run its own affairs and those
of the government with openness and in accordance with laws and
established procedures. For most of these intellectuals, the idea
of party pluralism owed little to admiration for the American
political and social system, which they criticized for its
disorderliness, polarization of rich and poor, and political
apathy. Although all believed that China could emulate some
aspects of the American political structure, few could conceive
of, or really wanted, an American-style system for China. Rather,
their expectation was that party competition would develop out of
China's existing system of "democratic consultation" with the
nine minor political parties. (20)
Cao Siyuan used the term "socialist parliamentary democracy" to
describe his vision. Yan Jiaqi emphasized "proceduralism." The
vision of these party intellectuals was not fully articulated in
print, probably because its realization depended upon a
step-by-step approach that could pass muster with the supreme
autocrat. But it was probably not far from the vision held by Hu
Yaobang and some of Zhao Ziyang's supporters, if not by Zhao
himself. Marxists such as Su Shaozhi, Li Honglin, and Wang
Ruoshui argued vigorously that democracy is not only a part of
the Marxist tradition but its fundamental aim. In short, what the
party democrats had in mind was not the overthrow of socialism
but democratic socialism.
That the democracy movement's mainstream was not anti-communist
does not, however, gainsay the fact that a fundamental conflict
existed between the democrats and the regime over the nature of
socialist democracy, as well as over the pace of progress toward
it. This conflict sharpened markedly beginning in 1987. In
retrospect, the purge of Hu Yaobang in January 1987 was a major
turning point. His demotion was accompanied by suppression of the
student demonstrations occurring at that time, and was followed
by the expulsion from the CCP of three ranking intellectuals
(Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang, and Liu Binyan), soon followed by
others, and by the initiation of a campaign to oppose "bourgeois
liberalization."
The events of early 1987 radicalized a portion of the
intellectuals, because the man in whom they rested many of their
hopes for the party fell, and the influence of Wang Zhen, Deng
Liqun, and others whom the intellectuals regarded as hostile
increased. In 1989, the key initial demands of the student
demonstrators in Beijing were to reverse the verdict on Hu and to
denounce the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. An
immediate sign of the serious impact of Hu's ouster was the
unprecedented signing of an open letter to the party Central
Committee by more than 1000 Chinese students in America, about
700 of whom used their real names. This open letter became the
first of several such letters and established the network that
was used in 1989 to mobilize the students against the Li Peng
regime. Meanwhile, the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign was
conducted so fecklessly that it created an atmosphere in which,
as Fang Lizhi said, "no one is afraid of anyone any more" (
Shei ye bupa shei
).
More fires broke out than the party's ideological watchdogs could
control. The Shanghai World Economic Herald published daring
articles on the failures of reform and the need for more radical
economic and political solutions. A magazine called New
Enlightenment made its debut in October 1988, having evaded the
party's control system for periodicals by registering itself as a
book series. The four issues that were published before the
spring crackdown contained essays by eminent theorists, many of
them party members, who were at odds with the regime's
ideological authorities. Contributors to these four issues, who
were soon to play prominent roles in Tiananmen or who were
arrested in the subsequent crackdown, included Liu Xiaobo, Bao
Zunxin, Jin Guantao, Li Honglin, Yu Haocheng, and Wang Ruoshui.
The Chinese Intellectual, long published overseas, produced its
first domestic issue in January 1989, also as a book series.
Other constituents of a nascent civil society that was gradually
working itself loose from effective CCP control were the Stone
Group Corporation and its Institute of Social Development, the
Beijing Social and Economic Research Institute (SERI), the
Capital Steel Research Institute, and the Happiness Bookstore.
These institutions had somewhat ambiguous relationships to the
CCP. Most of them were nominally "hung" (
gua
) from some part of the CCP organizational network, but they
operated independently. The same was true of some institutions
that the party itself had established, such as the Economic
System Reform Institute, the Rural Development Research
Institute, some institutes of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, and some sections of the China International Trust and
Investment Corporation. Politically-oriented intellectuals used
these institutions as bases from which to test the bounds of
tolerance more and more adventurously.
The regime was confronting the beginnings of a "desertion of the
intellectuals," against a backdrop of rising inflation and
corruption, the abortion of price reform, and the ever more
intense, long-standing succession conflict. (21) Deng Xiaoping
and Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong were not entirely wrong in
attributing the origins of the "turmoil and rebellion" to the
sharp challenge to the ethos of the regime presented by
intellectuals using increasingly sophisticated tactics. But their
analysis of events turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. By
proclaiming the intellectuals' democratic socialism to be
non-socialist, Deng set up a head-on conflict with the
intellectuals who would have preferred to work within the system.
On January 6, 1989, Fang Lizhi wrote an open letter to Deng
calling for the release of political prisoners, including Wei
Jingsheng, to mark the upcoming 40th anniversary of the PRC.
Thirty-three noted intellectuals followed with a letter of
support on February 16. Also in February, 42 leading Beijing
scientists joined the call for the release of "youth imprisoned
or sent to labor reform for ideological problems." And in March,
43 writers and theorists called on the NPC to grant amnesty to
Wei Jingsheng and others. (22) A young democratic activist named
Chen Jun, who had links with China Spring, was planning to use
the scheduled April 1989 meeting of the National People's
Congress to submit "A Report on Amnesty '89," amidst much
publicity, which he was skilled in generating. Petition campaigns
in Hong Kong, France, and the United States were launched in
support of the amnesty request. A shift of many of China's most
prestigious intellectuals to a pro-Wei position 10 years after
his arrest signalled how far the conflict between the regime and
the intellectuals had developed.
The intellectuals' impertinence annoyed Deng. He was confronted
with a coalescing group of influential non-party and party
intellectuals, informally linked to the hated China Spring, who
were conducting a sophisticated international publicity campaign
around an issue that was divisive within the regime and
embarrassing to him personally. To hold firm would look churlish;
to yield would legitimize an independent opposition. The regime
felt trapped and its responses revealed as much. The regime
declared the call for an amnesty illegal, clumsily blocked Fang
Lizhi from attending the banquet in Beijing to which President
George Bush had invited him, confiscated an international
petition to the NPC delivered from Hong Kong in support of the
amnesty drive on the grounds that it was propaganda, and used a
weak pretext to expel Chen Jun from the country. Not only were
these responses ineffective, they tarnished the regime's
international image.
The student movement thus emerged against the background of a
general crisis in the regime and a specific crisis in relations
between the regime and the intellectuals. But in rhetoric,
tactics, and demands, the students at first avoided pressing
their advantage too aggressively. They positioned themselves
within the established tradition of moderate democratic
remonstrance. They cast themselves not as dissidents but as loyal
followers, appealing to the authorities to live up to the values
the authorities themselves had articulated. The purpose of the
hunger strike, which was symbolically undertaken in front of the
Mao Mausoleum, in the shadow of the monument to the martyrs of
the communist revolution, was to force the leaders to recognize
the movement as being patriotic. The message was that the
students valued the welfare of the state above their own lives.
It was thoroughly in the tradition of Qu Yuan, who had lived in
the fourth century BC, and who committed suicide to show his
loyalty to the ruler who failed to heed his advice. Indeed, Qu
probably represented a more influential precedent for the
opposition's tactics of non-violence than the examples of Mahatma
Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or Corazon Aquino, so often mentioned
in the Western media.
The students' demands followed the logic of two decades of
Chinese democratic activism. Absolute power corrupts, and a good
socialist government must allow itself to be supervised by the
people. The demonstrators asked that the Chinese government
recognize popular sovereignty and the political rights that are
guaranteed by the PRC constitution. They carried signs that read
"We firmly support the correct leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party" and "The people love the people's police." (23)
They demanded that the government end corruption, overcome
bureaucratism, promote reform, and improve education. In effect
they paraphrased the words of the regime's spokesmen.
The two key demands were for a free press and for dialogue - the
latter implying recognition by the authorities of the students'
autonomous organizations. By a free press, the demonstrators did
not mean entrepreneurial, commercial, unregulated mass media that
compete for readers and live off advertising, but simply a press
that reports the truth. Except for such experiments as the World
Economic Herald, in the spring of 1989 most Chinese media
remained under the effective direct or indirect control of the
CCP's Propaganda Department or its local bureaus. What was
published or broadcast remained determined by the policy needs of
the party, although Chinese journalists have long argued that
both the people and the regime would be better served if Chinese
journalists had the authority to publish what they knew to be
true. Because corruption and special privilege are among the
features of the communist system that most alienate the people,
the students and the professional journalists who later joined
them argued that a truthful press would be the best mechanism for
cleaning up, and hence saving, the regime.
A draft press law defining the professional rights and
responsibilities of Chinese journalists has been undergoing
revision for years. According to some reports, the law was
finally scheduled for enactment in late 1989. (24 ) The
provisions of this law had been sharply debated, but even a
relatively conservative version would have gone a long way toward
meeting the demands of the demonstrators. The government needed
only to have made some final revisions and handed the draft to
the NPC to enact. But this possibility was overtaken by events.
The second key demand - for dialogue - was also ostensibly
compatible with the regime's own logic. As part of its political
reform, the government had promoted the development of the nine
minority democratic parties and increased its practice of
"democratic consultation" through the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference and informal forums with "democratic
personages." It was a CCP tradition for leaders to go to work
units and solicit the people's opinions. In the course of Deng's
reforms the party had re-established a system of offices for
"letters and visits work" to which individuals could come with
complaints. On April 4, 1989, the National People's Congress
passed an Administrative Proceedings Law, which enabled citizens
to take government organs to court to protect their rights. (25)
Accordingly, the students' demand for dialogue received
widespread support, including from school administrators and
political hacks, and from the official trade union federation.
(26)
The regime attempted to respond on its own terms to the demand
for dialogue. Cabinet spokesman Yuan Mu received a student
delegation for a nationally televised discussion on April 29. Li
Peng held talks with student leaders on May 18. United Front Work
Department director Yan Mingfu and other party leaders went to
Tiananmen Square to speak with hunger-strikers. And finally, in
his May 19 speech announcing the imposition of martial law, Li
Peng emphasized that "dialogue between the party and government
on the one hand, and the broad [masses of] students and
personages of various circles on the other, including dialogue
with students who have participated in parades, demonstrations,
classroom strikes, and hunger strikes, will still be actively
continued at many levels, through many channels, and in many
forms, in order fully to hear opinions from various quarters."
(27)
However, the dialogue that the authorities had already engaged
in, as well as the type of dialogue they promised in the future,
was not what the students demanded. The government attempted to
treat its encounters with the students as opportunities to feel
the public pulse without decentralizing power. Yuan Mu and Li
Peng acted as hosts and as authority figures, avuncularly urging
the students to return to classes, defending the government's
position, and delivering threats. The students in turn stated
that such encounters were unsatisfactory and acted out their
dissatisfaction by behaving impolitely at the meetings. They
demanded that the two parties be placed on an equal footing, that
the government's representatives in the dialogue be of high rank,
that observers and reporters be present, and that the government
give prompt responses to the students' questions. The students
also demanded that their representatives be elected by autonomous
student groups distinct from the puppet student unions
established under party sponsorship. (28)
Here was the Trojan horse that the regime could not accept. Had
this demand been granted, the students would have achieved the
legalization of the first completely independent political
organization in PRC history, and the effective negation of Deng
Xiaoping's four basic principles, as they were understood by
Deng. This demand explains why Deng had early on "determined [the
student movement's] nature" (
dingxing
) to be "a planned plot, a turmoil, whose essence is to negate
fundamentally CCP leadership and the socialist system." (29)
The Chinese leaders have been obsessed since 1956 with what they
see as the deterioration of the Leninist system in Poland and
Hungary. In this connection, the formation of a "Capital
Autonomous Workers' Association" during the demonstrations was a
particularly alarming development. Although it was a tiny group,
its existence evoked the specter of a Chinese "Solidarity."
Leaders of this group were arrested even before the general
crackdown of June 4. (30) As Li Peng told the other leaders
shortly after declaring martial law: "There was no way out. You
give a step, they advance a step; you retreat two steps, they
advance two steps. It had gotten to the point where there was
nowhere else to retreat. If we were going to retreat any further,
we might as well have handed China over to those people." (31)
The leaders preferred military repression to seeing China become
another Poland.
Chen Xitong, in the regime's most thorough indictment of the
democrats to date, contends that the democratic movement wanted
to achieve the violent overthrow of the government. (32) The
regime needed to portray the spontaneous, uncoordinated acts of
defensive violence by people throughout the city of Beijing on
the night of June 3, when the troops moved in, as part of a
coordinated plan in order to justify calling the democrats'
activities a "counter-revolutionary rebellion." Chen quoted some
unsigned leaflets as calling for the use of violence to overthrow
the CCP, but he was unable to name the organizations or
individuals responsible for them. Nor could he find direct quotes
from any specific democratic activist calling for the overthrow
of the party or the use of violence. Chen could only find
personal attacks on Deng and Li Peng, criticisms of the Chinese
socialist system, and appeals for thorough-going reform.
The only exception, one worth pausing over, is Chen's charge
against literary theorist Liu Xiaobo, who was arrested after June
4 and is believed to be in danger of receiving a heavy sentence
for his activities. (33) Liu was one of four intellectuals who
began a 48-72 hour hunger strike on June 2. Chen accused Liu of
membership in China Spring and quoted him as having stated in a
published interview: "We must organize an armed force among the
people to effect Zhao Ziyang's comeback." But an investigation by
a Chinese-language news magazine in New York has established that
these words were a mistranslation. The interview was conducted by
telephone in Chinese, but the transcript was prepared in English
in New York by the activist Chen Jun, for publication in the
West. Chen provided a copy of the transcript to the Independence
Evening News of Taiwan, which translated a statement by Liu, to
the effect that all social forces must be mobilized, back into
Chinese as "armed forces in society must be organized." The text
was reprinted in Hong Kong and from there picked up by Chinese
intelligence and quoted by Mayor Chen. (34) These facts are
important not only because they may affect Liu Xiaobo's fate, but
also because they confirm the nonviolent character of the
democratic movement even after the declaration of martial law.
After the June 4 killings and the subsequent wave of arrests,
many intellectuals broke completely with what they call the
Deng-Li Peng-Yang Shangkun regime. Liu Binyan, who was often
criticized by younger intellectuals after he was purged from the
CCP because he continued to express hope in the communist party,
has denounced the regime and predicts its fall within two years.
(35) This attitude is widespread. But the loss of hope in the
Deng regime has not brought with it a break in the moderate,
remonstrative tradition of Chinese democracy. The opposition has
stopped short of calls for either the use of violence or the
overthrow of the CCP.
The official press has taken pains to present the post-June 4
democratic movement in exile as consisting of revolutionaries who
seek to overthrow the Chinese government by armed action. This
assertion is made to legitimate condemning the movement's foreign
support as interference in China's internal affairs, and hence a
violation of international law. (36) However, these charges can
only be made plausible by selective quotation and quotation out
of context. No major democratic organization in exile so far has
called for either armed rebellion or terrorism, or, for that
matter, for the overthrow of the CCP.
Yan Jiaqi, who has emerged as the main spokesman for the
democratic exiles, has predicted that Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and
Yang Shangkun will "reap the storm" that their violence has sown
and will be publicly tried for their crimes. However, such
statements merely describe the fragility of a coercive regime,
and do not constitute a call for violence or a declaration of
anti-socialism. The program of the Democratic Chinese Alliance (
Minzhu Zhongguo zhenxian
), which Yan established with Uerkesh Daolet (Wuerkaixi), Liu
Binyan, Su Shaozhi, and Wan Runnan in Paris on July 20, makes
"reason, peace, and nonviolence our standards for action" and
"freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights" its goals.
(38) The organization's strategy, according to Yan, envisages
four stages. First will occur the inevitable fall of Li Peng,
which will come about through his own weakness and unpopularity
at home and abroad; second, the Alliance will press for reversal
of the verdict on the democratic movement; third, its members
will return home to participate in revising the constitution so
as to establish an open, pluralistic political system similar to
the ones that the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary are now
moving to establish; and finally, it will work to establish a
federal system in China within which the Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Tibet problems will be amenable to resolution. At the end of this
process, the CCP will be competing peacefully in elections with
the Kuomintang and the Democratic Alliance. Yan estimates that
the entire process will take 10 years or longer. (39) He argues
that democracy cannot be achieved by violent means and that the
democracy movement itself must begin the democratization process,
by relying on dialogue and the power of ideas rather than on
force.
The Association of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United
States established itself in Chicago in late July 1989 on a
platform of moderation. It is a loosely organized liaison group
rather than a political movement or party. It intends to work for
democratization chiefly through the dissemination of information
to China. As citizens of the PRC, its members seek to maintain
normal relations with China's officials and missions abroad. (40)
Even the organization that the Beijing authorities deem the most
radical and dangerous, the Chinese Alliance for Democracy or
China Spring, has not crossed the line separating reformism from
revolution. At its Fourth National Congress, held in Los Angeles
from June 23-26, 1989, China Spring debated a motion to include
"overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party in its constitution."
It also examined a proposal to abandon exclusive reliance on
nonviolent tactics in favor of "revolutionary" methods, which
included the formation of suicide squads to conduct "secret armed
struggle on the mainland" and the use of terrorism abroad against
PRC officials and their children in order to deter the
authorities from arresting and executing leaders of the
democratic movement. Both of these proposals were rejected. (41)
To say that the major dissident organizations in exile have
eschewed anti-communism and the use of violence is not to say
that these issues are not debated among exile democrats, (42) or
that there is no armed resistance in China or assistance for it
from abroad. Scattered shooting has been reported in Beijing, a
train wreck occurred that might have been due to sabotage, some
democratic movement leaders have been spirited out of the
country, and others have somehow found ways to evade capture.
Money is being collected by individual activists abroad for
unspecified purposes and some individual Chinese do speak of the
need to resort to violence. It is hard to gauge the prevalence
and impact of such activities, which are by nature secretive, and
obviously the advocacy and use of violence may increase. But so
far, violence remains a minor thread in the movement as a whole,
and it is not publicly advocated by any major democratic
organization.
Regime Monopoly of Force
Besides intellectual reasons for nonviolence, practical concerns
have dictated a nonviolent approach as well. The regime still
controls overwhelming military and police force, and recent
events have confirmed the importance of this factor. The events
of June showed that the instruments of proletarian dictatorship -
the least-mentioned but perhaps the most important of Deng's four
cardinal principles - are still firmly in the hands of the senior
leaders. It is hard to say whether their control is due to
ordinary military discipline, the effectiveness of the political
commissar system, or the reinforcement of the control system with
personal networks. Whatever the reason, the army and police
forces have stood firmly with the regime.
Their support explains why it would be unrealistic for the
democratic movement to take to the hills as Mao did in the
1930's. Conditions today are very different from those
encountered by the Jiangxi Soviet when it faced Chiang Kai-shek's
army. The total Nationalist forces were less than half the size
of the PLA today, and much more poorly trained and armed. Chiang
Kai-shek controlled only about one-fifth of the Nationalist
Government's military forces, and he controlled even those forces
through factional allies rather than directly. Chiang had to
allocate proportionally more military resources to national
defense than the PLA does today and had correspondingly fewer
resources to spare for internal security. Communications and
transport were primitive and the Soviet Union was willing to help
the insurgents. Despite all these advantages, the CCP barely
survived Chiang's extermination campaigns of the early 1930's.
(43)
The democrats say that if violence is to play a role in China's
future, it will have to come from within the Chinese military and
not from the democratic movement abroad or the democratic
underground in China. In a debate over the use of violence at the
recent Fourth Congress of the China Spring, Chairperson Hu Ping
stated: "When the 'Gang of Four' was arrested in 1976, this
certainly wasn't a peaceful change, but nobody complained about
it. If somebody comes forward now to arrest the group of people
who are holding power, there certainly won't be anyone to
complain that they did not use peaceful methods.... However, our
organization does not have the power to carry out a military
coup." (44) According to Wan Runnan of the Chinese Democratic
Alliance: "Our principle of nonviolence doesn't mean that no
blood will flow. There is a division of roles. Our role is to
carry out activities that are peaceful, rational, and nonviolent.
But others will play other roles." (45)
With violence ruled out as an option, nonviolence and support for
socialism offer the best possibility of building a broad
anti-regime coalition and maximizing official and unofficial
foreign support. As a China Spring leader stated during the
Fourth Congress debate, "only the flag of peaceful methods can
get wide popular acceptance.... If anybody here asks me for money
for guns [to use against the communists], I would certainly claim
to be giving you the guns to use for hunting birds." (46)
Social Composition of the Movement
The last factor that has argued for peaceful methods is the
social composition of the democratic movement. The demonstrators
in Beijing and other cities this spring were overwhelmingly
urbanites (
shimin
) - students, peddlers, office workers, teachers, shop and
factory workers. In exile, the class basis of the movement has
become even narrower. It is now composed almost exclusively of
students and intellectuals and a few ex-officials, with financial
support from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and elsewhere
(including Taiwan). The intellectuals are in no position to take
up arms without the support of other classes, if only because
their numbers are so small - less than half of 1 percent of the
Chinese population is college-educated. (47)
It is difficult to imagine an insurrection in China that is not
based in the countryside. So far as I know, the democratic
movement did not enjoy much active support in the rural areas.
The rural dwellers may have lacked information about the
democratic movement; if they participated in it, they would not
have enjoyed the same anonymity as did urban crowds; they were
busy earning a living; and, perhaps most importantly, although
the farmers were dissatisfied with the regime, they have not been
as severely affected by inflation as urban dwellers and have
greater possibilities for making do economically. As Wan Runnan
has said, "When the economy worsens, the peasants will suffer.
This is what is needed to change their political stance. For now,
they still hope to muddle through; they still think they can make
it." (48)
Of course, the social makeup of the countryside is becoming
increasingly complex. Rural dwellers include not only farmers but
also industrial workers, shop clerks, peddlers, fishermen,
teachers, monks, and local officials. Members of some of these
groups have evidently been willing to help the democratic
activists go underground or escape. But this scattered assistance
does not provide the critical mass necessary for a peasant
uprising.
Conclusion
Although the democratic movement has maintained its tradition of
moderation, a fundamental conflict over the nature of socialism
in China reached a climax in 1989. Mikhail Gorbachev was so
popular with the Chinese demonstrators not because he was seen,
as so many Americans see him, as leading a retreat from
socialism, but because the Chinese saw him as symbolizing the
hope that a Communist regime can permit a free press, a dialogue
with society, and an independent political opposition, and can
thrive under the stimulus of such challenges. Deng and the
surviving senior revolutionaries, by contrast, have remained
orthodox Stalinists on the question of power. To Deng, "the key
point is that [the demonstrators] wanted to overthrow our state
and the party. Failing to understand this means failing to
understand the nature of the matter.... Their goal was to
establish a bourgeois republic entirely dependent on the West."
(49)
Deng has a point: if his four principles are the standard of true
socialism, then the democrats did want to overthrow the socialist
system. If open, competitive democracy and political freedom are
the monopoly of the bourgeoisie, they did want to establish a
bourgeois republic. If the exercise of free speech that is
guaranteed by the Chinese constitution is illegal, then the
students and intellectuals denounced by Chen Xitong did commit
subversion. But the democrats continue to see their relation to
the regime differently. In the words of the biographer of China's
first remonstrator, Qu Yuan: "It was his fate to be faithful and
yet doubted, to be loyal and yet suffer slander - can one bear
this without anger?" (50)