In the late 1960's millions of Red Guards, who had earlier
  taken to the streets full of faith in Mao, found themselves
  discarded in the countryside where they discovered that the
  peasants were still living in primitive conditions after two
  decades of socialist development. In 1971, Mao Zedong's "closest
  comrade-in-arms" and trusted successor Lin Biao perished in the
  course of his alleged military coup attempt against the Great
  Helmsman. These events provoked a sense of moral outrage among
  significant numbers of Chinese, as they began to ask themselves
  how such things could have happened.
  
  
  All over the country, thousands formed small groups to discuss
  what had gone wrong with the political system. Some wrote letters
  of protest or advice to Chairman Mao; a few may have plotted
  violent action against the regime. These groups were rooted out
  by the police in campaigns called "cleansing of class ranks"
  (1968-69) and "one-strike, three-anti" (1970-71 ). Hundreds of
  their members were executed. (1) Although the regime surmounted
  this particular crisis of political control, its ideological
  control continued to weaken.
  
  
  Only one group of dissidents of the early 1970's became known in
  the West, after its members hung a wall poster in Canton in 1974
  under the pseudonym Li Yizhe. The poster attacked Maoist
  autocracy in the thin disguise of what it called the "Lin Biao
  system. " As a solution to the flaws of dictatorship, the Li
  Yizhe group called on the National People's Congress (NPC) to
  exercise its powers. (2) The Li Yizhe group thus introduced what
  was to become a consistent strategy of Chinese democrats, namely,
  attempting to ameliorate or circumvent one-party dictatorship by
  taking seriously the provision, found in every constitution of
  the People's Republic of China (PRC), that the National People's
  Congress is the supreme organ of government. This strategy was
  prominently reflected in many articles written during the debate
  over political reform in 1986-87. It surfaced again during the
  May 1989 crisis when Cao Siyuan, a self-styled lobbyist
  affiliated with the Stone Group Corporation (a privately-owned
  computer company in Beijing), and Hu Jiwei, a reformist member of
  the NPC Standing Committee, attempted to convene a meeting of the
  Standing Committee to overturn Premier Li Peng's May 20
  declaration of martial law. After the crackdown on June 4, Cao
  was arrested and Hu subjected to political denunciation.
  
  
  By 1989, what had started as congeries of small, isolated,
  clandestine groups which did not know of each other's existence,
  had grown step by step - through the Tiananmen Square Incident of
  1976, the Democracy Wall movement of 1978-79, and the student
  demonstrations of 1985 and 1986-87 - into a national force that
  apparently had the participation or sympathy of almost all urban
  residents in China. In the process, the movement for Chinese
  democracy became more complicated in its social composition and
  in its mix of political goals and tactics.
  
  
  Although the movement crossed a major watershed in 1989, when
  many intellectuals gave up hope that the regime of Deng Xiaoping
  was capable of reforming itself politically from within, both
  before and after June 4, the democratic movement of 1989 retained
  strong continuities in personnel, goals, and tactics with its
  predecessors. The mainstream democratic movement has always
  maintained hope that the authorities would initiate the changes
  for which it was calling. Indeed, the movement's moderation is
  striking. Chinese democrats have consistently positioned
  themselves as remonstrators rather than opponents, pressing the
  party to reform in its own interests and in keeping with its own
  ideals. (3) This position did not change in 1989. The movement's
  main organizations - comprised before June 4 of the Capital
  Federation of Autonomous College Student Organizations (
  Gaozilian
  ), the Capital Federation of Intellectual Circles (
  Beizhilian
  ), and the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation (
  Gongzilian
  ), and, after June 4, of the Chinese Democratic Alliance (
  Minzhu Zhongguo zhenxian
  ), the Association of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United
  States and the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (also known as
  China Spring) - have all said that they do not seek the overthrow
  of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Even after the regime's use
  of force on June 4, the main elements of the democracy movement
  have not changed their commitment to nonviolent methods in
  bringing about political change.
  
  
  Several factors account for the moderation of the democracy
  movement. The Chinese democrats have long believed that the
  regime was capable of reform from within, and the democrats
  themselves continued to believe in socialism, albeit of a
  democratic variety. But a moderate approach was also prudent, for
  the regime retained command over the police and the military, and
  it previously showed itself willing to use these instruments of
  coercion to suppress the opposition. Finally, the democracy
  movement was made up almost entirely of students and
  intellectuals, a small minority within Chinese society. These
  people lacked the numbers and the willingness to confront the
  regime head-on. These factors combined to incline Chinese
  democrats to press for a "self-limiting revolution" in the
  People's Republic of China.
  
  
  Reform From Within
  
  
  Perhaps the most important factor of those mentioned above is
  that the regime's ideology claims to be democratic and leaders of
  the opposition have thus had reason to hope for reform from
  within. All four constitutions of the PRC affirmed popular
  sovereignty, contained provisions for citizens to vote and run
  for office, and guaranteed the rights of free speech, assembly,
  petition and demonstration. Even if largely rhetorical, such
  provisions pay tribute to the strength of democratic yearnings in
  China and set standards that the regime has to pretend to meet in
  some fashion.
  
  
  Mao resolved the contradiction between rhetoric and reality with
  the concept of "democratic dictatorship," which held that the
  system was democratic because the totalitarian vanguard party was
  serving the highest interests of the people - whether they liked
  it or not. Those subjected to repression were not the people but
  their enemies. However cynical the argument, many Chinese
  believed in it and in Mao's benevolence and wisdom. Many blamed
  the problems that they encountered in their own lives on
  individual cadres rather than on the system and the assumption
  was widespread that Mao did not intend the abuses that were
  carried out in his name. Paradoxically, the practice of writing
  letters of remonstrance and appeal to Mao was common in the
  darkest days of his regime, perhaps more common than in his
  relatively lenient periods.
  
  
  Such beliefs had faded by the time of the Tiananmen Square
  Incident of April 5, 1976, especially among the sophisticated
  factory and office workers and Communist Youth League members in
  the capital who formed the main force of the demonstrators. (4)
  But the demonstrators still directed the brunt of their criticism
  at those around Mao and not at Mao himself. This made it possible
  for Deng's regime, which never contemplated full de-Maoization,
  to reverse the verdict on the incident only two years after Mao's
  death.
  
  
  Hopes for democratization from the top down revived after Mao's
  passing. Under Hu Yaobang's leadership of the CCP Organization
  Department, millions of individuals were exonerated from unjust
  criminal and political verdicts and rehabilitated, some
  posthumously. Property was returned, jobs restored, reputations
  cleared. Hu sponsored the "debate over practice as the sole
  criterion of truth," which opened the way for the expression of
  fresh ideas that party theorists had been nurturing in "cowpens"
  and May 7 cadre schools during the years when they were condemned
  to internal exile.
  
  
  Most participants in the Democracy Wall movement in 1978-79 were
  convinced that Deng wanted democratization and welcomed their
  suggestions. Only a few like Wei Jingsheng argued that Deng was a
  "new dictator," that temporary tolerance for unsolicited advice
  was not equivalent to a restructuring of power, and that a
  democratic climate without democratic institutions could easily
  dissipate wherever a change of course was initiated at the top.
  In the eyes of most intellectuals, the arguments of Wei and those
  who thought like him were premature. The intellectuals believed
  that reform is invariably a lengthy process; moreover, although
  Deng could not afford to move too fast because of conservative
  resistance in the party, he nevertheless was proceeding with
  deliberate speed in a democratic direction and had to be given
  plenty of time. Most democratic activists saw Deng's arrest of
  Wei and his fellow-thinkers as regrettable but inevitable. At the
  time it was felt by many that what Wei had said was true enough,
  but it was not the time to say it.
  
  
  In 1980, Deng himself called for political reform, reviving the
  hope that he would pilot China toward democracy. In a major
  speech delivered in August, he set modest goals and stressed that
  political reform was meant to strengthen, not weaken, party
  leadership. (5) Some people around Deng, such as Liao Gailong,
  took the speech as license to argue for more far-reaching
  reforms, including the vitalization of the people's congress
  system. (6) For some of the democrats, reform of the people's
  congress election system opened the vista of a parliamentary road
  to influence. They competed vigorously in the county-level
  elections held in 1979-81. (7) Until 1989, Deng continued to
  entertain the notion of political reform and allowed it to be
  discussed sporadically. An especially vigorous public discussion
  took place during 1987, after Deng had stated that political
  restructuring must be part of the reform agenda.
  
  
  It is clear in retrospect that Deng meant what he said when he
  warned that reform must not infringe on the four cardinal
  principles, namely, keeping to the socialist road, upholding the
  people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the CCP, and
  Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, but this warning was not
  so clearly understood at the time he issued it. His words and
  actions were ambiguous. His speeches contained little abstract
  political discussion, making it hard to determine the
  intellectual logic of his position. Some thought the ambiguity
  was tactical, as he maneuvered to maintain a fragile coalition of
  reformers and conservatives. Others viewed Deng as intellectually
  confused, unaware that he could not reform the economy without
  reforming politics. My guess is that Deng shared the assumption
  of many Chinese political thinkers, including Mao, that democracy
  is an instrument of mobilization whose function is to strengthen
  the links of citizens to the state, rather than a set of
  procedures for limiting state power to protect individual rights.
  (8) Thus, Deng did not see a contradiction between his vision of
  democracy and a benevolent dictatorship exercised by him and his
  party.
  
  
  Although one may argue that Chinese democrats misread Deng, they
  were probably not entirely wrong in thinking that Deng's closest
  aides and designated successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, were
  willing to consider relatively far-reaching measures of political
  reform. Hu, head of the CCP Organization Department in 1977-78
  and CCP General Secretary from 1982 to 1987, sponsored a two-part
  "Conference for the Discussion of Guidelines for Theoretical
  Work" (
  Lilun gongzuo wuxu hui
  ) in January-April 1979, at which liberal party thinkers he had
  rehabilitated or promoted began the overhaul of Chinese
  Marxism-Leninism needed to provide an ideological basis for
  reforms. (9) Under a pseudonym, at least one of the works
  produced at this conference found its way into a publication at
  Democracy Wall. (10)
  
  
  According to people who worked with Hu, his driving motive was to
  guarantee that another Cultural Revolution could never occur.
  Thus, he advocated subjecting the ruling party to outside
  challenges and criticism. Although his vision of political
  pluralism did not envisage a rotation in power between the CCP
  and other political parties, Hu was willing to consider a number
  of other suggestions, such as expanding the role of the NPC and
  dividing it into two or three chambers. Hu also believed that the
  women's organizations, the Communist Youth League, trade unions,
  and professional associations should have greater independence
  from the CCP, saying, "If we control them so tightly, why bother
  to have separate organizations?" (11)
  
  
  Hu was popular among intellectuals for his openness to their
  ideas, and was criticized by the army newspaper in 1982 for
  laxness in maintaining ideological discipline. He was purged from
  his party secretaryship in January 1987, after student
  demonstrations persuaded the party elders that he was allowing
  "bourgeois liberalization" to get out of hand. It was his death
  on April 15, 1989, that triggered the student demonstrations.
  
  
  Zhao Ziyang's record was more ambiguous. His chief commitment was
  to economic growth, and for him the main question seemed to be
  what sort of political structures would best meet the needs of
  economic development. It seemed inevitable that the marketization
  he favored would lead indirectly to the eventual break-up of
  dictatorship. But beyond this some advisors found him receptive
  to the argument that development in the modern age would
  eventually require lifting constraints on information and
  tolerating social pluralism and its more open political conflict.
  Zhao was associated with the theory of the "primary stage of
  socialism," which legitimated a diversity of social interests.
  His aide Bao Tong articulated the concept of "the new order of
  the socialist commodity economy," which rationalized wider use of
  elections and more political openness. (12) In 1986, Bao Tong
  authorized the establishment in Beijing of the Fund for the
  Reform and Opening of China, financed by the American businessman
  George Soros, and operating, at least officially, independently
  of Chinese government control. According to one report, Zhao
  commissioned the preparation of a political reform proposal that
  included ideas for multi-party competition and an independent
  press. (13) These actions indicated that Zhao was interested in a
  substantial opening and pluralization of the political system, at
  least over the long term.
  
  
  On the other hand, Zhao presented a notably cautious program in
  the section on political reform of his report to the 13th Party
  Congress in October 1987. In the months before his fall from
  power, people around him promoted a theory called the "new
  authoritarianism," which argued that in the present, relatively
  early state of development China needs an enlightened autocrat to
  direct economic development while keeping order and protecting
  people's rights. We will probably never know to what extent this
  argument reflected Zhao's technocratic convictions, and to what
  extent it was propounded as a means to induce Deng Xiaoping to
  hand over power to Zhao quickly and without dividing it among
  several successors.
  
  
  In any case, during the May-June crisis Zhao's tactics shifted.
  According to the subsequent official charges against him, he
  supported Deng Xiaoping's hard line on the demonstrations while
  he was on a state visit to North Korea in late April. But upon
  his return he changed his position, calling for the withdrawal of
  the controversial People's Daily editorial that branded the
  demonstrations a "turmoil" and advocating other concessions. (14)
  His conciliatory words and actions in public indicated that calls
  for the resignation of Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping did not
  displease him. On the eve of the declaration of martial law,
  officials and intellectuals associated with Zhao issued a
  six-point statement blaming the crisis on Deng and calling for
  special NPC and CCP meetings to examine errors of the past and,
  by implication, to summon Zhao (who had already been unofficially
  purged) back to power. In the aftermath of the June 4 crackdown,
  many members of Zhao's liberal brain trust fled the country. They
  now appear to maintain links with the exile democratic movement
  headed by Yan Jiaqi, a political scientist and former advisor to
  Zhao. Because they represent a faction within the CCP that may
  some day return to power, their alliance with the democracy
  movement allows Chinese democrats to continue even now to hope
  for reform of the communist regime from within.
  
  
  That Zhao's interest in democracy during the crisis may have been
  tactical does not render it insignificant. Transitions from
  authoritarianism to democracy normally come about when
  authoritarian rulers see tactical advantages in such shifts. If
  Zhao's effort to play the democracy card had succeeded, he might
  have reverted soon to a more authoritarian position in order to
  consolidate his power and address China's economic problems. But
  meanwhile, Zhao's behavior demonstrated that those who hoped for
  change of the Chinese communist system from within had some
  grounds for their hopes.
  
  
  Whatever the personal views of various party leaders, by the end
  of 1988, the actual achievements of officially-sponsored
  political reform were meager. They included regularization and
  expansion of the role of people's congresses, direct elections of
  county-level people's congress deputies, limitations on terms of
  office for some party and state officials, establishment of
  employee councils in state-owned enterprises, and the enactment
  of several hundred laws conducive to procedural regularity. The
  reform program also endorsed collective leadership in the party,
  orderly succession, the rule of law, and independence of the
  judiciary, but these desiderata remained weakly
  institutionalized. (15) There were signs that some in the
  leadership favored further steps toward political reform in 1989,
  including passing a law making the press more free and
  independent but still subject ultimately to party guidance;
  enacting a law on demonstrations permitting peaceful gatherings
  while still enabling the government to restrict their scope; (16)
  reducing the role of party officials in student organizations,
  trade unions, enterprises, and schools, while preserving the
  party organs in these units as watchdogs; and further
  strengthening the role of the National People's Congress as a
  legislative and oversight organ under overall party guidance. In
  the crisis of spring 1989, even such half-way steps might have
  sufficed to satisfy many of the demonstrators. In the long run,
  they were unlikely to satisfy Chinese democrats, any more than
  similar solutions seem to have satisfied Polish or Hungarian
  democrats. The push for real freedom of the press and of
  association, as well as for truly competitive elections would
  have resumed, probably sooner rather than later. But in the
  meantime, the liberal images of Deng, Hu, and Zhao, whether they
  were justified or not, helped to keep Chinese democrats looking
  for change from above.
  
  
  The Democracy Movement's Ideals
  
  
  The second reason for the Chinese democrats' long-standing
  posture of loyalty to the regime is the nature of their own
  ideals. With few exceptions, the opposition's vision of Chinese
  democracy has been compatible with a socialist order. At
  Democracy Wall in 1978-79, most of the proposals were made from
  the perspective of party members or non-party loyalists. They
  called for very modest measures of political openness and
  competition, more in the spirit of Mao's idea of a party with an
  "open door" to society than in the spirit of a Western
  multi-party system. In 1986-87, the high point of the intra-party
  and academic debate over political reform that had been initiated
  by Deng, major proposals included establishing a civil service
  system; strengthening the National People's Congress by reducing
  its size and enlarging its system of committees; separating the
  party from the government; giving a clear legal definition to
  vertical and horizontal jurisdictions in the bureaucracy;
  publishing more financial data to assure greater governmental
  "transparency"; providing firmer guarantees of an independent
  judiciary; consulting more systematically with experts and
  technocrats in policy-making; and paying more consistent
  attention to procedures in governmental decision-making. (17) The
  emphases were on openness and procedural regularity.
  
  
  None of the 1986-87 proposals that I have seen was anti-socialist
  or calculated to lead to the overthrow of the party. To be sure,
  the idea of socialism had become so diluted that it would have
  been hard to identify an anti-socialist proposal unless its
  author labeled it as such. Most of the democrats' proposals dealt
  with economic structures indirectly if at all and, among the
  economic reformers, even proposals for privatization and
  marketization of the economy were cast as versions of socialism.
  (For example, a proposal for issuing stock in state enterprises
  was presented as promoting "ownership by the whole people.")
  After the purge of Zhao Ziyang, a People's Daily editorial
  charged that in a 1987 intra-party meeting even Zhao advocated
  abandoning the insistence on upholding socialism on the grounds
  that nobody knew any more what socialism was. (18) Similarly,
  proposals for competitive electoral politics would not have been
  cast as open challenges to the principle of party leadership even
  if they were intended as such. Indeed, the moderate guise of most
  proposals may signify little except that Chinese are adept at
  waving the red flag to oppose the red flag.
  
  
  My own reading of the political reform debates and personal
  encounters with some of the participants, however, lead me to
  believe that in most cases the reformers wanted to keep China
  socialist as they understood the term. For example, Yan Jiaqi, Li
  Honglin, Su Shaozhi, and Cao Siyuan, who were named in Beijing
  Mayor Chen Xitong's post-crackdown report as progenitors of the
  "turmoil" and "counter-revolutionary rebellion" in Beijing, (19)
  were among the leading participants in the 1986-87 discussions of
  political reform. All were party members; all seemed to espouse
  some version of socialism.
  
  
  With some individual variation, the vision of the reformist party
  intellectuals centered on a system in which the communist party
  continued to be dominant but was checked by competitive elections
  and a free press in order to keep it honest and close to the
  people. This dominant party would run its own affairs and those
  of the government with openness and in accordance with laws and
  established procedures. For most of these intellectuals, the idea
  of party pluralism owed little to admiration for the American
  political and social system, which they criticized for its
  disorderliness, polarization of rich and poor, and political
  apathy. Although all believed that China could emulate some
  aspects of the American political structure, few could conceive
  of, or really wanted, an American-style system for China. Rather,
  their expectation was that party competition would develop out of
  China's existing system of "democratic consultation" with the
  nine minor political parties. (20)
  
  
  Cao Siyuan used the term "socialist parliamentary democracy" to
  describe his vision. Yan Jiaqi emphasized "proceduralism." The
  vision of these party intellectuals was not fully articulated in
  print, probably because its realization depended upon a
  step-by-step approach that could pass muster with the supreme
  autocrat. But it was probably not far from the vision held by Hu
  Yaobang and some of Zhao Ziyang's supporters, if not by Zhao
  himself. Marxists such as Su Shaozhi, Li Honglin, and Wang
  Ruoshui argued vigorously that democracy is not only a part of
  the Marxist tradition but its fundamental aim. In short, what the
  party democrats had in mind was not the overthrow of socialism
  but democratic socialism.
  
  
  That the democracy movement's mainstream was not anti-communist
  does not, however, gainsay the fact that a fundamental conflict
  existed between the democrats and the regime over the nature of
  socialist democracy, as well as over the pace of progress toward
  it. This conflict sharpened markedly beginning in 1987. In
  retrospect, the purge of Hu Yaobang in January 1987 was a major
  turning point. His demotion was accompanied by suppression of the
  student demonstrations occurring at that time, and was followed
  by the expulsion from the CCP of three ranking intellectuals
  (Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang, and Liu Binyan), soon followed by
  others, and by the initiation of a campaign to oppose "bourgeois
  liberalization."
  
  
  The events of early 1987 radicalized a portion of the
  intellectuals, because the man in whom they rested many of their
  hopes for the party fell, and the influence of Wang Zhen, Deng
  Liqun, and others whom the intellectuals regarded as hostile
  increased. In 1989, the key initial demands of the student
  demonstrators in Beijing were to reverse the verdict on Hu and to
  denounce the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. An
  immediate sign of the serious impact of Hu's ouster was the
  unprecedented signing of an open letter to the party Central
  Committee by more than 1000 Chinese students in America, about
  700 of whom used their real names. This open letter became the
  first of several such letters and established the network that
  was used in 1989 to mobilize the students against the Li Peng
  regime. Meanwhile, the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign was
  conducted so fecklessly that it created an atmosphere in which,
  as Fang Lizhi said, "no one is afraid of anyone any more" (
  Shei ye bupa shei
  ).
  
  
  More fires broke out than the party's ideological watchdogs could
  control. The Shanghai World Economic Herald published daring
  articles on the failures of reform and the need for more radical
  economic and political solutions. A magazine called New
  Enlightenment made its debut in October 1988, having evaded the
  party's control system for periodicals by registering itself as a
  book series. The four issues that were published before the
  spring crackdown contained essays by eminent theorists, many of
  them party members, who were at odds with the regime's
  ideological authorities. Contributors to these four issues, who
  were soon to play prominent roles in Tiananmen or who were
  arrested in the subsequent crackdown, included Liu Xiaobo, Bao
  Zunxin, Jin Guantao, Li Honglin, Yu Haocheng, and Wang Ruoshui.
  The Chinese Intellectual, long published overseas, produced its
  first domestic issue in January 1989, also as a book series.
  
  
  Other constituents of a nascent civil society that was gradually
  working itself loose from effective CCP control were the Stone
  Group Corporation and its Institute of Social Development, the
  Beijing Social and Economic Research Institute (SERI), the
  Capital Steel Research Institute, and the Happiness Bookstore.
  These institutions had somewhat ambiguous relationships to the
  CCP. Most of them were nominally "hung" (
  gua
  ) from some part of the CCP organizational network, but they
  operated independently. The same was true of some institutions
  that the party itself had established, such as the Economic
  System Reform Institute, the Rural Development Research
  Institute, some institutes of the Chinese Academy of Social
  Sciences, and some sections of the China International Trust and
  Investment Corporation. Politically-oriented intellectuals used
  these institutions as bases from which to test the bounds of
  tolerance more and more adventurously.
  
  
  The regime was confronting the beginnings of a "desertion of the
  intellectuals," against a backdrop of rising inflation and
  corruption, the abortion of price reform, and the ever more
  intense, long-standing succession conflict. (21) Deng Xiaoping
  and Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong were not entirely wrong in
  attributing the origins of the "turmoil and rebellion" to the
  sharp challenge to the ethos of the regime presented by
  intellectuals using increasingly sophisticated tactics. But their
  analysis of events turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. By
  proclaiming the intellectuals' democratic socialism to be
  non-socialist, Deng set up a head-on conflict with the
  intellectuals who would have preferred to work within the system.
  
  
  On January 6, 1989, Fang Lizhi wrote an open letter to Deng
  calling for the release of political prisoners, including Wei
  Jingsheng, to mark the upcoming 40th anniversary of the PRC.
  Thirty-three noted intellectuals followed with a letter of
  support on February 16. Also in February, 42 leading Beijing
  scientists joined the call for the release of "youth imprisoned
  or sent to labor reform for ideological problems." And in March,
  43 writers and theorists called on the NPC to grant amnesty to
  Wei Jingsheng and others. (22) A young democratic activist named
  Chen Jun, who had links with China Spring, was planning to use
  the scheduled April 1989 meeting of the National People's
  Congress to submit "A Report on Amnesty '89," amidst much
  publicity, which he was skilled in generating. Petition campaigns
  in Hong Kong, France, and the United States were launched in
  support of the amnesty request. A shift of many of China's most
  prestigious intellectuals to a pro-Wei position 10 years after
  his arrest signalled how far the conflict between the regime and
  the intellectuals had developed.
  
  
  The intellectuals' impertinence annoyed Deng. He was confronted
  with a coalescing group of influential non-party and party
  intellectuals, informally linked to the hated China Spring, who
  were conducting a sophisticated international publicity campaign
  around an issue that was divisive within the regime and
  embarrassing to him personally. To hold firm would look churlish;
  to yield would legitimize an independent opposition. The regime
  felt trapped and its responses revealed as much. The regime
  declared the call for an amnesty illegal, clumsily blocked Fang
  Lizhi from attending the banquet in Beijing to which President
  George Bush had invited him, confiscated an international
  petition to the NPC delivered from Hong Kong in support of the
  amnesty drive on the grounds that it was propaganda, and used a
  weak pretext to expel Chen Jun from the country. Not only were
  these responses ineffective, they tarnished the regime's
  international image.
  
  
  The student movement thus emerged against the background of a
  general crisis in the regime and a specific crisis in relations
  between the regime and the intellectuals. But in rhetoric,
  tactics, and demands, the students at first avoided pressing
  their advantage too aggressively. They positioned themselves
  within the established tradition of moderate democratic
  remonstrance. They cast themselves not as dissidents but as loyal
  followers, appealing to the authorities to live up to the values
  the authorities themselves had articulated. The purpose of the
  hunger strike, which was symbolically undertaken in front of the
  Mao Mausoleum, in the shadow of the monument to the martyrs of
  the communist revolution, was to force the leaders to recognize
  the movement as being patriotic. The message was that the
  students valued the welfare of the state above their own lives.
  It was thoroughly in the tradition of Qu Yuan, who had lived in
  the fourth century BC, and who committed suicide to show his
  loyalty to the ruler who failed to heed his advice. Indeed, Qu
  probably represented a more influential precedent for the
  opposition's tactics of non-violence than the examples of Mahatma
  Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or Corazon Aquino, so often mentioned
  in the Western media.
  
  
  The students' demands followed the logic of two decades of
  Chinese democratic activism. Absolute power corrupts, and a good
  socialist government must allow itself to be supervised by the
  people. The demonstrators asked that the Chinese government
  recognize popular sovereignty and the political rights that are
  guaranteed by the PRC constitution. They carried signs that read
  "We firmly support the correct leadership of the Chinese
  Communist Party" and "The people love the people's police." (23)
  They demanded that the government end corruption, overcome
  bureaucratism, promote reform, and improve education. In effect
  they paraphrased the words of the regime's spokesmen.
  
  
  The two key demands were for a free press and for dialogue - the
  latter implying recognition by the authorities of the students'
  autonomous organizations. By a free press, the demonstrators did
  not mean entrepreneurial, commercial, unregulated mass media that
  compete for readers and live off advertising, but simply a press
  that reports the truth. Except for such experiments as the World
  Economic Herald, in the spring of 1989 most Chinese media
  remained under the effective direct or indirect control of the
  CCP's Propaganda Department or its local bureaus. What was
  published or broadcast remained determined by the policy needs of
  the party, although Chinese journalists have long argued that
  both the people and the regime would be better served if Chinese
  journalists had the authority to publish what they knew to be
  true. Because corruption and special privilege are among the
  features of the communist system that most alienate the people,
  the students and the professional journalists who later joined
  them argued that a truthful press would be the best mechanism for
  cleaning up, and hence saving, the regime.
  
  
  A draft press law defining the professional rights and
  responsibilities of Chinese journalists has been undergoing
  revision for years. According to some reports, the law was
  finally scheduled for enactment in late 1989. (24 ) The
  provisions of this law had been sharply debated, but even a
  relatively conservative version would have gone a long way toward
  meeting the demands of the demonstrators. The government needed
  only to have made some final revisions and handed the draft to
  the NPC to enact. But this possibility was overtaken by events.
  
  
  The second key demand - for dialogue - was also ostensibly
  compatible with the regime's own logic. As part of its political
  reform, the government had promoted the development of the nine
  minority democratic parties and increased its practice of
  "democratic consultation" through the Chinese People's Political
  Consultative Conference and informal forums with "democratic
  personages." It was a CCP tradition for leaders to go to work
  units and solicit the people's opinions. In the course of Deng's
  reforms the party had re-established a system of offices for
  "letters and visits work" to which individuals could come with
  complaints. On April 4, 1989, the National People's Congress
  passed an Administrative Proceedings Law, which enabled citizens
  to take government organs to court to protect their rights. (25)
  Accordingly, the students' demand for dialogue received
  widespread support, including from school administrators and
  political hacks, and from the official trade union federation.
  (26)
  
  
  The regime attempted to respond on its own terms to the demand
  for dialogue. Cabinet spokesman Yuan Mu received a student
  delegation for a nationally televised discussion on April 29. Li
  Peng held talks with student leaders on May 18. United Front Work
  Department director Yan Mingfu and other party leaders went to
  Tiananmen Square to speak with hunger-strikers. And finally, in
  his May 19 speech announcing the imposition of martial law, Li
  Peng emphasized that "dialogue between the party and government
  on the one hand, and the broad [masses of] students and
  personages of various circles on the other, including dialogue
  with students who have participated in parades, demonstrations,
  classroom strikes, and hunger strikes, will still be actively
  continued at many levels, through many channels, and in many
  forms, in order fully to hear opinions from various quarters."
  (27)
  
  
  However, the dialogue that the authorities had already engaged
  in, as well as the type of dialogue they promised in the future,
  was not what the students demanded. The government attempted to
  treat its encounters with the students as opportunities to feel
  the public pulse without decentralizing power. Yuan Mu and Li
  Peng acted as hosts and as authority figures, avuncularly urging
  the students to return to classes, defending the government's
  position, and delivering threats. The students in turn stated
  that such encounters were unsatisfactory and acted out their
  dissatisfaction by behaving impolitely at the meetings. They
  demanded that the two parties be placed on an equal footing, that
  the government's representatives in the dialogue be of high rank,
  that observers and reporters be present, and that the government
  give prompt responses to the students' questions. The students
  also demanded that their representatives be elected by autonomous
  student groups distinct from the puppet student unions
  established under party sponsorship. (28)
  
  
  Here was the Trojan horse that the regime could not accept. Had
  this demand been granted, the students would have achieved the
  legalization of the first completely independent political
  organization in PRC history, and the effective negation of Deng
  Xiaoping's four basic principles, as they were understood by
  Deng. This demand explains why Deng had early on "determined [the
  student movement's] nature" (
  dingxing
  ) to be "a planned plot, a turmoil, whose essence is to negate
  fundamentally CCP leadership and the socialist system." (29)
  
  
  The Chinese leaders have been obsessed since 1956 with what they
  see as the deterioration of the Leninist system in Poland and
  Hungary. In this connection, the formation of a "Capital
  Autonomous Workers' Association" during the demonstrations was a
  particularly alarming development. Although it was a tiny group,
  its existence evoked the specter of a Chinese "Solidarity."
  Leaders of this group were arrested even before the general
  crackdown of June 4. (30) As Li Peng told the other leaders
  shortly after declaring martial law: "There was no way out. You
  give a step, they advance a step; you retreat two steps, they
  advance two steps. It had gotten to the point where there was
  nowhere else to retreat. If we were going to retreat any further,
  we might as well have handed China over to those people." (31)
  The leaders preferred military repression to seeing China become
  another Poland.
  
  
  Chen Xitong, in the regime's most thorough indictment of the
  democrats to date, contends that the democratic movement wanted
  to achieve the violent overthrow of the government. (32) The
  regime needed to portray the spontaneous, uncoordinated acts of
  defensive violence by people throughout the city of Beijing on
  the night of June 3, when the troops moved in, as part of a
  coordinated plan in order to justify calling the democrats'
  activities a "counter-revolutionary rebellion." Chen quoted some
  unsigned leaflets as calling for the use of violence to overthrow
  the CCP, but he was unable to name the organizations or
  individuals responsible for them. Nor could he find direct quotes
  from any specific democratic activist calling for the overthrow
  of the party or the use of violence. Chen could only find
  personal attacks on Deng and Li Peng, criticisms of the Chinese
  socialist system, and appeals for thorough-going reform.
  
  
  The only exception, one worth pausing over, is Chen's charge
  against literary theorist Liu Xiaobo, who was arrested after June
  4 and is believed to be in danger of receiving a heavy sentence
  for his activities. (33) Liu was one of four intellectuals who
  began a 48-72 hour hunger strike on June 2. Chen accused Liu of
  membership in China Spring and quoted him as having stated in a
  published interview: "We must organize an armed force among the
  people to effect Zhao Ziyang's comeback." But an investigation by
  a Chinese-language news magazine in New York has established that
  these words were a mistranslation. The interview was conducted by
  telephone in Chinese, but the transcript was prepared in English
  in New York by the activist Chen Jun, for publication in the
  West. Chen provided a copy of the transcript to the Independence
  Evening News of Taiwan, which translated a statement by Liu, to
  the effect that all social forces must be mobilized, back into
  Chinese as "armed forces in society must be organized." The text
  was reprinted in Hong Kong and from there picked up by Chinese
  intelligence and quoted by Mayor Chen. (34) These facts are
  important not only because they may affect Liu Xiaobo's fate, but
  also because they confirm the nonviolent character of the
  democratic movement even after the declaration of martial law.
  
  
  After the June 4 killings and the subsequent wave of arrests,
  many intellectuals broke completely with what they call the
  Deng-Li Peng-Yang Shangkun regime. Liu Binyan, who was often
  criticized by younger intellectuals after he was purged from the
  CCP because he continued to express hope in the communist party,
  has denounced the regime and predicts its fall within two years.
  (35) This attitude is widespread. But the loss of hope in the
  Deng regime has not brought with it a break in the moderate,
  remonstrative tradition of Chinese democracy. The opposition has
  stopped short of calls for either the use of violence or the
  overthrow of the CCP.
  
  
  The official press has taken pains to present the post-June 4
  democratic movement in exile as consisting of revolutionaries who
  seek to overthrow the Chinese government by armed action. This
  assertion is made to legitimate condemning the movement's foreign
  support as interference in China's internal affairs, and hence a
  violation of international law. (36) However, these charges can
  only be made plausible by selective quotation and quotation out
  of context. No major democratic organization in exile so far has
  called for either armed rebellion or terrorism, or, for that
  matter, for the overthrow of the CCP.
  
  
  Yan Jiaqi, who has emerged as the main spokesman for the
  democratic exiles, has predicted that Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and
  Yang Shangkun will "reap the storm" that their violence has sown
  and will be publicly tried for their crimes. However, such
  statements merely describe the fragility of a coercive regime,
  and do not constitute a call for violence or a declaration of
  anti-socialism. The program of the Democratic Chinese Alliance (
  Minzhu Zhongguo zhenxian
  ), which Yan established with Uerkesh Daolet (Wuerkaixi), Liu
  Binyan, Su Shaozhi, and Wan Runnan in Paris on July 20, makes
  "reason, peace, and nonviolence our standards for action" and
  "freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights" its goals.
  (38) The organization's strategy, according to Yan, envisages
  four stages. First will occur the inevitable fall of Li Peng,
  which will come about through his own weakness and unpopularity
  at home and abroad; second, the Alliance will press for reversal
  of the verdict on the democratic movement; third, its members
  will return home to participate in revising the constitution so
  as to establish an open, pluralistic political system similar to
  the ones that the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary are now
  moving to establish; and finally, it will work to establish a
  federal system in China within which the Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
  Tibet problems will be amenable to resolution. At the end of this
  process, the CCP will be competing peacefully in elections with
  the Kuomintang and the Democratic Alliance. Yan estimates that
  the entire process will take 10 years or longer. (39) He argues
  that democracy cannot be achieved by violent means and that the
  democracy movement itself must begin the democratization process,
  by relying on dialogue and the power of ideas rather than on
  force.
  
  
  The Association of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United
  States established itself in Chicago in late July 1989 on a
  platform of moderation. It is a loosely organized liaison group
  rather than a political movement or party. It intends to work for
  democratization chiefly through the dissemination of information
  to China. As citizens of the PRC, its members seek to maintain
  normal relations with China's officials and missions abroad. (40)
  
  
  Even the organization that the Beijing authorities deem the most
  radical and dangerous, the Chinese Alliance for Democracy or
  China Spring, has not crossed the line separating reformism from
  revolution. At its Fourth National Congress, held in Los Angeles
  from June 23-26, 1989, China Spring debated a motion to include
  "overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party in its constitution."
  It also examined a proposal to abandon exclusive reliance on
  nonviolent tactics in favor of "revolutionary" methods, which
  included the formation of suicide squads to conduct "secret armed
  struggle on the mainland" and the use of terrorism abroad against
  PRC officials and their children in order to deter the
  authorities from arresting and executing leaders of the
  democratic movement. Both of these proposals were rejected. (41)
  
  
  To say that the major dissident organizations in exile have
  eschewed anti-communism and the use of violence is not to say
  that these issues are not debated among exile democrats, (42) or
  that there is no armed resistance in China or assistance for it
  from abroad. Scattered shooting has been reported in Beijing, a
  train wreck occurred that might have been due to sabotage, some
  democratic movement leaders have been spirited out of the
  country, and others have somehow found ways to evade capture.
  Money is being collected by individual activists abroad for
  unspecified purposes and some individual Chinese do speak of the
  need to resort to violence. It is hard to gauge the prevalence
  and impact of such activities, which are by nature secretive, and
  obviously the advocacy and use of violence may increase. But so
  far, violence remains a minor thread in the movement as a whole,
  and it is not publicly advocated by any major democratic
  organization.
  
  
  Regime Monopoly of Force
  
  
  Besides intellectual reasons for nonviolence, practical concerns
  have dictated a nonviolent approach as well. The regime still
  controls overwhelming military and police force, and recent
  events have confirmed the importance of this factor. The events
  of June showed that the instruments of proletarian dictatorship -
  the least-mentioned but perhaps the most important of Deng's four
  cardinal principles - are still firmly in the hands of the senior
  leaders. It is hard to say whether their control is due to
  ordinary military discipline, the effectiveness of the political
  commissar system, or the reinforcement of the control system with
  personal networks. Whatever the reason, the army and police
  forces have stood firmly with the regime.
  
  
  Their support explains why it would be unrealistic for the
  democratic movement to take to the hills as Mao did in the
  1930's. Conditions today are very different from those
  encountered by the Jiangxi Soviet when it faced Chiang Kai-shek's
  army. The total Nationalist forces were less than half the size
  of the PLA today, and much more poorly trained and armed. Chiang
  Kai-shek controlled only about one-fifth of the Nationalist
  Government's military forces, and he controlled even those forces
  through factional allies rather than directly. Chiang had to
  allocate proportionally more military resources to national
  defense than the PLA does today and had correspondingly fewer
  resources to spare for internal security. Communications and
  transport were primitive and the Soviet Union was willing to help
  the insurgents. Despite all these advantages, the CCP barely
  survived Chiang's extermination campaigns of the early 1930's.
  (43)
  
  
  The democrats say that if violence is to play a role in China's
  future, it will have to come from within the Chinese military and
  not from the democratic movement abroad or the democratic
  underground in China. In a debate over the use of violence at the
  recent Fourth Congress of the China Spring, Chairperson Hu Ping
  stated: "When the 'Gang of Four' was arrested in 1976, this
  certainly wasn't a peaceful change, but nobody complained about
  it. If somebody comes forward now to arrest the group of people
  who are holding power, there certainly won't be anyone to
  complain that they did not use peaceful methods.... However, our
  organization does not have the power to carry out a military
  coup." (44) According to Wan Runnan of the Chinese Democratic
  Alliance: "Our principle of nonviolence doesn't mean that no
  blood will flow. There is a division of roles. Our role is to
  carry out activities that are peaceful, rational, and nonviolent.
  But others will play other roles." (45)
  
  
  With violence ruled out as an option, nonviolence and support for
  socialism offer the best possibility of building a broad
  anti-regime coalition and maximizing official and unofficial
  foreign support. As a China Spring leader stated during the
  Fourth Congress debate, "only the flag of peaceful methods can
  get wide popular acceptance.... If anybody here asks me for money
  for guns [to use against the communists], I would certainly claim
  to be giving you the guns to use for hunting birds." (46)
  
  
  Social Composition of the Movement
  
  
  The last factor that has argued for peaceful methods is the
  social composition of the democratic movement. The demonstrators
  in Beijing and other cities this spring were overwhelmingly
  urbanites (
  shimin
  ) - students, peddlers, office workers, teachers, shop and
  factory workers. In exile, the class basis of the movement has
  become even narrower. It is now composed almost exclusively of
  students and intellectuals and a few ex-officials, with financial
  support from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and elsewhere
  (including Taiwan). The intellectuals are in no position to take
  up arms without the support of other classes, if only because
  their numbers are so small - less than half of 1 percent of the
  Chinese population is college-educated. (47)
  
  
  It is difficult to imagine an insurrection in China that is not
  based in the countryside. So far as I know, the democratic
  movement did not enjoy much active support in the rural areas.
  The rural dwellers may have lacked information about the
  democratic movement; if they participated in it, they would not
  have enjoyed the same anonymity as did urban crowds; they were
  busy earning a living; and, perhaps most importantly, although
  the farmers were dissatisfied with the regime, they have not been
  as severely affected by inflation as urban dwellers and have
  greater possibilities for making do economically. As Wan Runnan
  has said, "When the economy worsens, the peasants will suffer.
  This is what is needed to change their political stance. For now,
  they still hope to muddle through; they still think they can make
  it." (48)
  
  
  Of course, the social makeup of the countryside is becoming
  increasingly complex. Rural dwellers include not only farmers but
  also industrial workers, shop clerks, peddlers, fishermen,
  teachers, monks, and local officials. Members of some of these
  groups have evidently been willing to help the democratic
  activists go underground or escape. But this scattered assistance
  does not provide the critical mass necessary for a peasant
  uprising.
  
  
  Conclusion
  
  
  Although the democratic movement has maintained its tradition of
  moderation, a fundamental conflict over the nature of socialism
  in China reached a climax in 1989. Mikhail Gorbachev was so
  popular with the Chinese demonstrators not because he was seen,
  as so many Americans see him, as leading a retreat from
  socialism, but because the Chinese saw him as symbolizing the
  hope that a Communist regime can permit a free press, a dialogue
  with society, and an independent political opposition, and can
  thrive under the stimulus of such challenges. Deng and the
  surviving senior revolutionaries, by contrast, have remained
  orthodox Stalinists on the question of power. To Deng, "the key
  point is that [the demonstrators] wanted to overthrow our state
  and the party. Failing to understand this means failing to
  understand the nature of the matter.... Their goal was to
  establish a bourgeois republic entirely dependent on the West."
  (49)
  
  
  Deng has a point: if his four principles are the standard of true
  socialism, then the democrats did want to overthrow the socialist
  system. If open, competitive democracy and political freedom are
  the monopoly of the bourgeoisie, they did want to establish a
  bourgeois republic. If the exercise of free speech that is
  guaranteed by the Chinese constitution is illegal, then the
  students and intellectuals denounced by Chen Xitong did commit
  subversion. But the democrats continue to see their relation to
  the regime differently. In the words of the biographer of China's
  first remonstrator, Qu Yuan: "It was his fate to be faithful and
  yet doubted, to be loyal and yet suffer slander - can one bear
  this without anger?" (50)